How do we build information security in Russia
Zapad nam not a decree and not a prison. His culture is not an ideal of perfection. The construction of his spiritual act (or, in his turn, his spiritual acts) may be in accordance with his abilities and his needs, but to our strengths, our tasks, our historical calling and spiritual structure, it does not correspond and does not satisfy. And we don’t need to chase after him and give us a sample from him. The West has its own errors, ailments, weaknesses and dangers. Nam nѣt salvation in Westernism. We have our own ways and tasks. And in this is the meaning of the Russian idea.
Ivan Aleksandrovich Ilyin “On the Russian Idea” (1948)
In connection with the recent turbulent political events, the importance of information protection of Russia has increased sharply, and, obviously, will continue to grow with the growing influence of our country in the world.
Russia (and the Russian world, including in the understanding of I.A. Ilyin) must be reliably protected. I propose for discussion a draft action plan. I think for some readers the measures I have proposed seem excessive. However, when we talk about protection, it is better to do everything with a margin.
In further elaboration of the protection plan, it should be borne in mind that people working in different fields of activity need different levels and means of protection. More about this in the last part of the article.
I do not pretend to disclose the full picture. These are only preliminary sketches that require clarification, generalization and refinement.
So, the defense of Russia :
1) Mobile devices : a significant danger lies in the huge number of uncontrolled mobile devices.
Solution: rebooting the device operating system when crossing the Russian border. “External” (“alien”) OS is recorded in the depository of the border control point, is replaced by a similar OS. Access to the mobile network is allowed only to "their" devices. The equipment of mobile operators monitors an attempt to access "alien" devices and immediately gives an alarm. The same thing with radio. Same thing with space communications devices. Access should be only to authorized satellites (at the state level).
2) Embedded devices, including implanted onesmust be subject to mandatory registration when crossing the border of the Russian Federation. All protocols of interaction with the outside world should be transferred to the depository of Russian special services (special depository). Exit via an unregistered (unauthorized) protocol should be monitored and signal a threat.
3) General purpose computers . The OS restart solution is not suitable for them. The volumes and variety of programs are too large. Solution: on all computers with a “foreign” OS, the first time they enter the network, a filtering program should be installed. All interaction with the outside world, whether it be wired or wireless networks, goes through a filter. The filter logs all types of access. In fact, we are talking about putting any "not ours" computer in a special "sandbox".
I note that the filter should not decrypt the transmitted information, but only register the fact of communication with an anonymous correspondent. Communication with an anonymous correspondent must be fully recorded, including the content or blocked if the content is encrypted. The opening (decryption) of information should be carried out by decision of the court.
4) Creating a depository of all permitted programs - all programs used in the Russian world must be transferred in their original form to the special depository. It is necessary to ensure the simplicity of updating programs in the depository and the possibility of comparison. Naturally, the study of programs and the search for built-in "bugs" and "bookmarks" will be carried out only if necessary.
5) Restriction of access to national information. There should be a legislative ban on the storage of national information outside the Russian world. For example, all registration data about Russian users of the international social network should be stored only in data centers in Russia. Access to the data centers should be organized by our special services and should be guaranteed no access from the special services of other countries.
6) All the highest state bodies of Russia (legislative, executive and judicial branches of government) on the territory of the Russian Federation should be placed in network sandboxes; all their interactions must be logged. The same is for the organizations of the diplomatic service of the Russian Federation. The same is true for organizations funded from abroad (NPOs).
7) Must be createdleast favored nation (and trust) regime for all foreign companies that are directly related to intelligence services of other countries, primarily for Google, Microsoft and Apple.
Measures can be very different, for example:
- a mandatory requirement to pay all taxes in Russia; double taxation;
- additional tax on advertising; advertising for such companies should cost more; money over the price of ordinary advertising should go to the Russian Technological Development Fund;
- a mandatory requirement to transfer all source texts to the special services depository. If the texts are not provided and not certified in the Russian Federation - a ban on use on the territory of the Russian Federation.
8) All programs and equipment in Russia should work in accordance withstate standards adopted in Russia . It is necessary to get away from the automatic use of standards adopted by American (European) standardization institutions. The standard must be Russian or international. International standardization institutions should be protected from the influence of any commercial structures.
9) Russian (Russian-speaking) resources, which are fundamentally important for the security of the Russian Federation, must be protected by the state ( state protectionism ). It is not just about the aerospace and nuclear industries, not just about the military-industrial complex. Everything is clear with them.
It's about what we all use in everyday life; about services fundamentally important for the Russian world:
- search services (free search);
- postal services (free email);
- social networks;
- video depositories;
- large electronic publishers.
The state must ensure the continuous and uninterrupted operation of these services. Enterprises, the owners of such services, should receive state preferences (not only tax), in exchange for control and support from the state. The share of foreign capital in these enterprises should be legally limited; it is generally desirable to ban the sale of shares of such enterprises to foreigners.
We need a dedicated social network in which there will be access to officials at any level. I think that this social network should be managed by a private company, but under state control, and have state preferences.
10) The highest responsibility of our counterintelligence structures and absolute trust in them must be ensured . It should be obvious to the whole world that if Russian counterintelligence decrypts political, diplomatic or business correspondence, then there are good reasons for this. And that no data will be used for other purposes, naturally, except for using it against organizations hostile to us.
As you can see, part of the proposed protection measures are general, and part should be detailed and planned for different areas of activity and population groups.
We can conditionally divide the areas of activity into:
- state activity;
- science, culture and education;
Obviously, different groups need different degrees of protection and different means of protection. Moreover, each such group is also heterogeneous. For example, in “state activity”, one can single out a part that requires extremely high protection:
- special services;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- nuclear power.
Similarly, from science and education we can distinguish a part that requires a high level of protection, for example, work in the field of robotics, biotechnology, supercomputers, programming technology, encryption. And for them, protective equipment should be tougher.
Separately, it is necessary to think over measures and methods of protection for Russians in other countries.
However, I do not pretend to be the ultimate truth. My goal is to draw attention to the topic and get government support for such work. In general, the measures listed above should provide information protection for the country in the era of the Second Cold World War (World War I).
Then the question arises - how to get down to business. Obviously, in order to protect, you need to achieve information independence , or information sovereignty of the country.
Ensuring information sovereignty is a challenge whose adoption will bring Russia to a fundamentally different level of development. A quarter of a century ago, our country accepted the Japanese challenge of creating 5th generation computers (Fifth Generation). VNTK “Start” was created and achieved a lot. Unfortunately, “Start” worked at the end of the Soviet Union and what was then developed was imperceptibly dissolved in museums and private companies.
Now Russia is on the rise, we need to set ourselves transcendental tasks and solve them. Computer science and a huge intellectual human potential can and should become a locomotive of the development and strengthening of the country.
We cannot wait for the state to unfold and create the necessary structure. We must unite and take action!
about the author
Alexey Nedorya - candidate of physical and mathematical sciences (1994).
Born January 11, 1962 (Chita). In 1979 he entered the Novosibirsk State University (NSU). In 1982, he became one of the founders of Intruders Club, an informal computer group of students at the physics and mechanics and mathematics faculties of NSU. In 1984 he graduated from NSU (thesis - Edison compiler Per Brinch Hansen for the Elbrus-1 multiprocessor computer complex). In the spring of 1984, he participated in the creation of the legendary Kronos group (the first Soviet 32-bit processor), was the main developer of the Excelsior OS and several compilers from the languages of Modula-2 / Oberon-2. From 1985 to 1988 worked at the All-Russian Scientific and Technical Complex “Start” (USSR response to the Japanese ambitious fifth-generation computer project). Further, until 1998, at the Institute of Informatics Systems. A.P. Ershov of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1990 He met personally with Nicklaus Wirth; In 1991, he completed an internship with Professor Wirth at ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich). In 1991-1994 worked on the XDS instrumental multipurpose system (Modula-2 and Oberon-2) and software code generation systems for spaceborne systems. Since 1994 - global IT outsourcing and offshore programming. Since 2001 - development of a new programming toolkit.