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VLESS Vulnerability: bypassing split tunneling in clients

The article reveals a critical vulnerability in VLESS clients based on xray/sing-box, allowing spyware to bypass split tunneling and private spaces to extract IP. Tested popular clients, Happ is especially dangerous due to config dump. Recommended measures: IP separation, geoip routing.

VLESS clients are vulnerable: IP leak via SOCKS5 without auth
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Critical VLESS Client Flaw: Bypassing Split Tunneling and IP Leaks

All popular mobile VLESS clients based on xray/sing-box run an unauthenticated local SOCKS5 proxy. This lets spyware bypass per-app split tunneling and private spaces (like Knox, Shelter, or Island) by directly scanning localhost ports and pulling the proxy's exit IP.

The standard traffic flow is:

VpnService -> tun2socks -> xray socks5 -> VPN server -> freedom

Spyware connects to SOCKS5 while skipping VpnService. Private spaces isolate VpnService but not the loopback interface, leaving the proxy exposed.

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Regulators' playbooks list common ports: SOCKS (1080, 9000, 5555, 16000-16100), HTTP (80, 443, 3128). This technique has been used in the wild.

Tested Clients

Tested March 10, 2026; developers notified. As of April 7, 2026, no fixes:

  • Happ: Critically vulnerable, dumps configs via unauthenticated xray API (HandlerService). Traffic decryption possible when combined with another xray flaw.
  • v2RayTun: Vulnerable.
  • V2BOX: Vulnerable.
  • v2rayNG: Vulnerable.
  • Hiddify: Vulnerable.
  • Exclave: Vulnerable.
  • Npv Tunnel: Vulnerable.
  • Neko Box: Vulnerable.

Clash and sing-box in standard setups are also at risk. The fix requires SOCKS5 authentication, but UDP stays unprotected.

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Happ Vulnerability Details

Happ enables unauthenticated xray API via HandlerService, exposing configs: keys, inbound IP, SNI. Reverse engineering found no justification—xray restarts on config changes anyway. Devs cited stats needs (LogService would suffice) but refused fixes. Updates blocked after App Store removal.

Recommendation: Server-side blocks via UserAgent Happ/*. One compromised Happ client can leak your entire server to censors.

Protection Steps

No client is fully secure. iOS woes worsened by app store removals.

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  • Split inbound and outbound IPs. Alternative: Wrap outbound traffic in CloudFlare WARP.
  • Selective routing: geoip:ru -> direct, everything else -> proxy.
  • Server-side block of geoip:ru to dodge traffic pattern analysis from spy apps (Yandex, Wildberries, Ozon).

Windows example: v2rayN with "Everything except Russia" preset.

Key Takeaways

  • The flaw lets spyware scan localhost, grab proxy IPs, and dodge VpnService plus private spaces.
  • Happ also leaks configs via unsecured xray API, risking traffic decryption.
  • No clients patched; fix needs SOCKS5 auth + dropping UDP.
  • Protect with IP splitting, geoip routing, Happ/RU blocks on servers.
  • Technique's been exploited before; regulators know about it.

— Editorial Team

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