January 25, 2016 at 14:34UK government promotes crypto protocol for VoIP with backdoor
The British government, together with GCHQ intelligence experts, are proposing the adoption of a new standard for cryptographically secure voice communications - a protocol called MIKEY-SAKKE. This protocol supposedly should increase the security of VoIP and telephone communications by encrypting traffic. But experts pay attention to the specific features of the protocol, which make it vulnerable in its architecture.
MIKEY-SAKKE - an encryption system based on personal data (ID-based system), which necessarily requires a trusted key distribution center. Therefore, key escrow is essentially integrated here and there is no perfect direct secrecy. “The only reasonable explanation for designing a protocol with these properties is third-party wiretapping,”says Bruce Schneier.
The general principle of operation of MIKEY-SAKKE is shown in the diagram.
Other experts agree with Bruce Schneier. In their opinion, the architecture of the MIKEY-SAKKE system was originally developed with an eye to invisible and untraceable mass surveillance. “This may be a requirement for exceptional cases, such as the transfer of sensitive information between government departments,” writes security specialist Steven Murdoch. - However, in the vast majority of cases, the properties of MIKEY-SAKKE are actively harmful to security. "They create a single point of failure, requiring tremendous effort, skills and costs to ensure its safety, such resources are beyond the capabilities of most companies."
Stephen Murdoch points out that now there are better technologies for encrypting voice communications. Comparison of different protocols, see the table.
“In general, developers of protocols and systems should evaluate the ethical consequences of their actions from the point of view of political and power structures that will naturally follow after their use,” Murdoch said. “MIKEY-SAKKE is the latest example that raises questions about the policies of many countries, including the United Kingdom, which holds the special services responsible for protecting companies and individuals from espionage, creating a conflict of interest.”
It should also be noted that before this, the GCHQ intelligence service rejected the more secure MIKEY-IBAKE protocol, because it did not allow discreet listening to communications.
MIKEY-SAKKE - an encryption system based on personal data (ID-based system), which necessarily requires a trusted key distribution center. Therefore, key escrow is essentially integrated here and there is no perfect direct secrecy. “The only reasonable explanation for designing a protocol with these properties is third-party wiretapping,”says Bruce Schneier.
The general principle of operation of MIKEY-SAKKE is shown in the diagram.
Other experts agree with Bruce Schneier. In their opinion, the architecture of the MIKEY-SAKKE system was originally developed with an eye to invisible and untraceable mass surveillance. “This may be a requirement for exceptional cases, such as the transfer of sensitive information between government departments,” writes security specialist Steven Murdoch. - However, in the vast majority of cases, the properties of MIKEY-SAKKE are actively harmful to security. "They create a single point of failure, requiring tremendous effort, skills and costs to ensure its safety, such resources are beyond the capabilities of most companies."
Stephen Murdoch points out that now there are better technologies for encrypting voice communications. Comparison of different protocols, see the table.
“In general, developers of protocols and systems should evaluate the ethical consequences of their actions from the point of view of political and power structures that will naturally follow after their use,” Murdoch said. “MIKEY-SAKKE is the latest example that raises questions about the policies of many countries, including the United Kingdom, which holds the special services responsible for protecting companies and individuals from espionage, creating a conflict of interest.”
It should also be noted that before this, the GCHQ intelligence service rejected the more secure MIKEY-IBAKE protocol, because it did not allow discreet listening to communications.
