New information about VPNFilter: conducting an attack on user devices, expanded list of network equipment

    image

    Introduction


    Analytical division of Cisco Talos, together with technology partners, revealed additional details related to malware "VPNFilter". Since the first publication on this topic, we have discovered that the malicious software VPNFilter targets more device models and has expanded the list of companies whose products may be infected. In addition, we found that malware possesses additional functions, including the ability to launch attacks on user terminals. A recent Talos blog posting looked at a large-scale campaign to spread VPNFilter to network devices for the home or small office, as well as to a number of networked storage systems. In the same publication it was mentioned that the threat research is ongoing. After the release of the first publication, several industry partners provided us with additional information that helped us advance in the investigation. WithinThis publication, we present the results of this investigation, received in the last week.
    First, we found that the list of manufacturers of equipment whose products are the goal of a malicious campaign must be supplemented by new participants. This equipment companies ASUS, D-Link, Huawei, Ubiquiti, UPVEL and ZTE. Also, additional models of devices released by Linksys, MikroTik, Netgear and TP-Link were exposed to this attack. At the present time, our investigation did not reveal any evidence of the vulnerability of network devices released by Cisco. An updated list of devices is shown below.

    In addition, we discovered a new malicious module that functions at stage 3, which ensures that malicious content is added to web traffic when such traffic is transmitted through an infected device. At the time of the first publication, we did not have all the information about the modules operating in stage 3. The new module allows the initiators of a malicious campaign to implement exploits aimed at user end devices using the “attack-in-the-middle” approach (i.e., intercept network traffic and injection of malicious code into traffic without the user's knowledge). Thanks to the new results of the investigation, we can confirm that the threat capabilities are beyond the scope of the network device, and the threat can spread further into the network, which includes the compromised network device.

    In addition, we found an additional module that functions in step 3, which provides any module that functions in step 2 and does not support “kill”, the ability to disable the device. When launched, this module removes all traces of the presence of malicious VPNFilter on the device and puts the device into an inoperable state. The results of the analysis of this module, which is called “dstr”, are also presented below.

    Finally, we continued the study of the packet sniffer operating at stage 3, including a detailed analysis of Modbus traffic detection methods.

    Technical Information


    New modules operating in stage 3


    'ssler' (terminal device hacking module - javascript injection)

    The ssler module (we pronounce this name “Esler”) provides the possibility of data theft and injection of JavaScript code by intercepting all traffic destined for port 80 and transmitted through the device. This module maintains a list of parameters that determine the behavior of the module and those websites for which traffic will be intercepted. The first parameter defines the directory on the device in which the stolen data will be stored. The purpose of the other parameters is described below:

    • dst: - used in the created iptables rules to specify the IP address or CIDR range of the destination addresses to which the rule should apply.
    • src: - used in the created iptables rules to specify the IP address or CIDR range of the sender addresses to which the rule should apply.
    • dump: - all HTTP request headers for any domain specified in the dump parameter will be saved in the reps _ *. bin file.
    • site: - if the domain is specified as the value of the site parameter, its web pages will be the target of the javascript injection.
    • hook: - this parameter specifies the URL of the javascript file for injection.

    The first action performed by the ssler module is to configure the iptables device to redirect all traffic addressed to port 80 to the local service that operates on port 8888. It is started using the insmod command to insert three iptables modules into the core (ip_tables.ko, iptable_filter .ko, iptable_nat.ko) and then executes the following shell commands:

    • iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 8888 -j ACCEPT
    • iptables -t nat -I PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 80 -j REDIRECT --to-port 8888
    • Example: ./ssler logs src: 192.168.201.0/24 dst: 10.0.0.0/16

    -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.201.0/24 -d 10.0.0.0/16 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8888

    Note. To ensure that these rules are not deleted, ssler deletes them and immediately adds them back about every four minutes.

    Any outgoing web requests to port 80 will be intercepted by the ssler module, they can be analyzed and modified before sending to the legitimate HTTP service. All HTTP requests are translated from https to http. Before sending requests to legitimate HTTP servers, the following changes are made to them:

    • All occurrences of the string “https: //” are replaced with “http: //” to convert requests from protected HTTP resources to requests to unprotected, to ensure that sensitive data, such as credentials, can be received.
    • If the request contains the header Connection: keep-alive, it is replaced with Connection: close
    • If the request contains an Accept-Encoding header with a gzip value, it is replaced with Accept-Encoding: plaintext / none to prevent compression of responses using gzip (there are exceptions for certain file types, for example, graphic files).

    If the host is specified as the value of the dump: parameter, the details of the request are saved to disk for subsequent collection by the attacker, including the URL, port, and all request headers. If the host is not specified as the value of the dump: parameter, then only queries with the Authorization header or URLs containing credentials will be saved. URLs that contain credentials are determined by the following criteria — they must contain the string “assword =” or “ass =” and one of the following lines:

    • sername =
    • ser =
    • ame =
    • ogin =
    • ail =
    • hone =
    • session% 5Busername
    • session% 5Bpassword
    • session [password

    All POST requests to accounts.google.com containing the string "signin" will also be saved for later collection.

    After all the above modifications, the ssler module initiates a connection to a legitimate HTTP server and sends a modified request to port 80. Then the ssler module receives a response from the HTTP server and makes the following changes to the response before sending the response to the victim:

    • The answer with https: // in the Location header is converted to http: //
    • The following fields are ignored, i.e. not forwarded to customer:
      • Alt-scv
      • Vary
      • Content-MD5
      • content-security-policy
      • X-fb-debug
      • public-key-pins-report-only
      • Access-Control-Allow-Origin
    • For the entire answer, conversion from https with http is performed - all occurrences of https: // are replaced with \ x20http: //.
    • If a domain (or part of a domain name, for example, “google”) is specified as the value of the site: parameter, a javascript injection attempt is performed in all Content-Type: text / html or Content-Type: text / javascript responses. The requirement is the presence of a string and its length enough for the value of the hook: parameter to fit into it. The tag will be replaced with

      All domains, for requests to which https is replaced with http (that is, domains are contained in links), added to the list of sslstripped-domains. Subsequent requests intercepted by the ssler module to the domains included in this list will be carried out via HTTPS (port 443), and not via HTTP (port 80). By default, the list contains four domains, so the ssler module will always connect to these domains via HTTPS (port 443): www.google.com , twitter.com,www.facebook.com , or www.youtube.com .

      'dstr' (device outage module)

      The dstr modules are used to disable an infected device by deleting the files necessary for normal operation. This module deletes all files and directories associated with the operation of malware, before deleting the remaining files in the system, perhaps this should prevent the detection of malware during the investigation of the incident.

      We performed a detailed analysis of the dstr_i586 module. This module first deleted itself from the disk, and then terminated the execution of the parent process functioning at stage 2. Then it searches for all the running processes with the names vpnfilter, security and tor and terminates their work. It then explicitly deletes the following files and directories:

      • /var/tmp/client_ca.crt
      • /var/tmp/client.key
      • /var/tmp/client.crt
      • / var / run / vpnfilterm / htpx
      • / var / run / vpnfilter
      • /var/run/vpn.tmp
      • /var/run/vpn.pid
      • / var / run / torrc
      • / var / run / tord / hidden_ssh / private_key
      • / var / run / tord / hidden_ssh / hostname
      • / var / run / tor
      • /var/run/msvf.pid
      • /var/run/client_ca.crt
      • /var/run/client.key
      • /var/run/client.crt
      • /var/pckg/mikrotik.o
      • /var/pckg/.mikrotik.
      • /var/msvf.pid
      • /var/client_ca.crt
      • /var/client.key
      • /var/client.crt
      • /tmp/client_ca.crt
      • /tmp/client.key
      • /tmp/client.crt
      • /flash/nova/etc/loader/init.x3
      • / flash / nova / etc / init / security
      • / flash / nova / etc / devel-login
      • /flash/mikrotik.o
      • /flash/.mikrotik.
      • / var / run / vpnfilterw /
      • / var / run / vpnfilterm /
      • / var / run / tord / hidden_ssh /
      • / var / run / tord /
      • / flash / nova / etc / loader /
      • / flash / nova / etc / init /

      The dstr module clears the flash memory of the device by overwriting the bytes of all available devices / dev / mtdX with the value 0xFF. Then the shell command rm -rf / * is executed, designed to remove all the contents of the file system, and the device reboots. At this point in time, there are no files on the device that are required for operation, and the device cannot boot.

      Additional study of a packet sniffer operating at stage 3

      'ps' (packet sniffer operating at stage 3)

      One of the samples of the packet sniffer that we have at stage 3, is the R600VPN sample (Lexra architecture, reminds MIPS). This sample is a packet sniffer that performs a search for parameters for implementing basic authentication and monitoring ICS traffic, designed for TP-LINK R600-VPN. Malicious software uses the “raw socket” mechanism to detect connections to a predefined IP address, and it takes into account only TCP packets with a length of at least 150 bytes (note: the total packet length is indicated with all headers taken into account. Depending on the size of the TCP header , PDU logging can be from 56 to 96 bytes in length). This sniffer provides access to network traffic only for reading, but not for modification. To implement the functions that provide traffic modification,

      image

      In packets that are transmitted to a port other than 502, the search for basic authentication parameters is performed; when such parameters are detected, they are logged.

      • Else: (non-Modbus traffic): collect credentials used for basic HTTP authentication
        • Recipient IP Address == command line argument
        • Sender port> 1024
        • The port of the sender! = 8080
        • The port of the sender! = 8088
        • Data packet length> 20 bytes
        • The package does not contain any of the following lines

          <? Xml
          Basic Og ==
          /tmUnblock.cgi
          Password Required
          <div
          <form
          <input
          this. and .get
          {
          }
          200 OK
          <span
          <SPAN
          <DIV
      • Package contains 'Authorization: Basic' OR one username / password combination

        • Username
          • User =
          • user =
          • Name =
          • name =
          • Usr =
          • usr =
          • Login =
          • login =
        • Password
          • Pass =
          • pass =
          • Password =
          • password =
          • Passwd =
          • passwd =
      • Logging: Logs the IP addresses and ports (but not the contents of the packets) associated with port 502. Checking whether the traffic is Modbus traffic is not performed.
        • Modbus: SourceIP, SourcePort, DestinationIP, DestinationPort and * modbus * tagging
        • Other traffic: write the entire contents of the packet to the log if and only if the packet meets the criteria for basic HTTP authentication

      Conclusion


      New findings from the investigation convinced us that the threat posed by the VPNFilter malware continues to grow. We have not only installed new models and brands of infected devices, but also discovered the potential of malicious software related to hacking of end devices. Thus, the area of ​​impact of this threat is beyond the scope of network devices and it includes networks served by infected devices. If the attack is successful, the attacker will be able to deploy any required functional module to accomplish his goals, including rootkits, information retrieval tools and destructive malware.

      Talos thanks all independent researchers, companies and technology partners from around the world who shared information and participated in the analysis of this threat. Your actions helped us to form a deeper understanding of this malicious campaign, and in some cases significantly improved the situation. We perfectly understand that this is a team sport, and we sincerely thank you for your help.

      We will continue to monitor VPNFilter and work with our partners to assess the level of threat as it develops, as well as to ensure the reliable protection of our customers and the awareness of the community.

      Updated list of compromise indicators (IOC)


      As stated above, we suspect that there are additional indicators of compromise and versions of this malware, which we do not know about at present. The following IOC list reflects our current views. New IOCs are highlighted in BOLD.

      Known C2 Domains and IP Addresses


      Associated with the 1st stage


      photobucket [.] com / user / nikkireed11 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / kmila302 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / lisabraun87 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / eva_green1 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / monicabelci4 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / katyperry45 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / saragray1 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / millerfred / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / jeniferaniston1 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / amandaseyfried1 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / suwe8 / library
      photobucket [.] com / user / bob7301 / library
      toknowall [.] com

      Associated with the 2nd stage


      91.121.109 [.] 209
      217.12.202 [.] 40
      94.242.222 [.] 68
      82.118.242 [.] 124
      46.151.209 [.] 33
      217.79.179 [.] 14
      91.214.203 [.] 144
      95.211 .198 [.] 231
      195.154.180 [.] 60
      5.149.250 [.] 54
      94.185.80 [.] 82
      62.210.180 [.] 229
      91.200.13 [.] 76
      23.111.177 [.] 114

      6b57dcnonk2edf5a [ .] onion / bin32 / update.php
      tljmmy4vmkqbdof4 [.] onion / bin32 / update.php
      zuh3vcyskd4gipkm [.] onion / bin32 / update.php
      4seiwn2ur4f65zo4.onion/bin256/update.php
      zm3lznxn27wtzkwa.onion/bin16/update.php

      Known file hash sums


      Malicious software that functions on the 1st stage


      50ac4fcd3fbc8abcaa766449841b3a0a684b3e217fc40935f1ac22c34c58a9ec
      0e0094d9bd396a6594da8e21911a3982cd737b445f591581560d766755097d92
      b9770ec366271dacdae8f5088218f65a6c0dd82553dd93f41ede586353986124
      51e92ba8dac0f93fc755cb98979d066234260eafc7654088c5be320f431a34fa
      6a76e3e98775b1d86b037b5ee291ccfcffb5a98f66319175f4b54b6c36d2f2bf
      313d29f490619e796057d50ba8f1d4b0b73d4d4c6391cf35baaaace71ea9ac37

      Malicious software, functioning on the 2nd stage


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      9eb6c779dbad1b717caa462d8e040852759436ed79cc2172692339bc62432387
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      24b3931e7d0f65f60bbb49e639b2a4c77de83648ff08e097ff0fa6a53f5c7102
      4497af1407d33faa7b41de0c4d0741df439d2e44df1437d8e583737a07ec04a1
      579b2e6290c1f7340795e42d57ba300f96aef035886e80f80cd5d0bb4626b5fc
      eeb3981771e448b7b9536ba5d7cd70330402328a884443a899696a661e4e64e5
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      d1bc07b962ccc6e3596aa238bb7eda13003ea3ca95be27e8244e485165642548
      eec5cd045f26a7b5d158e8289838b82e4af7cf4fc4b9048eaf185b5186f760db
      29ae3431908c99b0fff70300127f1db635af119ee55cd8854f6d3270b2e3032e
      ca0bb6a819506801fa4805d07ee2ebaa5c29e6f5973148fe25ed6d75089c06a7
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      4cbf9ecb6ca4f2efed86ba6ebf49436c65afe7ae523ec9dae58e432a9d9a89d0
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      b2dd77af9dd9e8d7d4ebc778f00ff01c53b860a04c4e0b497f2ae74bb8a280c0

      Modules operating in the 3rd stage


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      d1e6ec5761f78899332b170c4ca7158dccd3463dab2e58e51e5b6c0d58c7d84f
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      ae74f62881eb224e58f3305bb1da4f5cb7ccff53c24ab05db622807d74e934fb
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      3gd3444e75garadiner660f3250d3c75d38e2d5e2e5e5d3e23d23e6d75e2e5e5d3e23d23e6gf2350d3cf

      Checksum Self-Signed Certificate


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      c52b3901a26df1680acbfb9e6184b321f0b22dd6c4bb107e5e071553d375c851
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      fb47ba27dceea486aab7a0f8ec5674332ca1f6af962a1724df89d658d470348f
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      909cf80d3ef4c52abc95d286df8d218462739889b6be4762a1d2fac1adb2ec2b
      044bfa11ea91b5559f7502c3a504b19ee3c555e95907a98508825b4aa56294e4
      c0f8bde03df3dec6e43b327378777ebc35d9ea8cfe39628f79f20b1c40c1b412
      8f1d0cd5dd6585c3d5d478e18a85e7109c8a88489c46987621e01d21fab5095d
      d5dec646c957305d91303a1d7931b30e7fb2f38d54a1102e14fd7a4b9f6e0806
      c0f8bde03df3dec6e43b327378777ebc35d9ea8cfe39628f79f20b1c40c1b412

      Attackable devices


      We have found that the devices listed below are subject to attack. Given the scale of the study, many observations are performed remotely without physical access to the device, so in many cases it is difficult for us to determine the specific software version and device model.

      Given the accumulated volume of information about this threat, we believe that this list is not exhaustive, and other devices may also be at risk.

      Asus Products:


      • RT-AC66U (new)
      • RT-N10 (new)
      • RT-N10E (new)
      • RT-N10U (new)
      • RT-N56U (new)
      • RT-N66U (new)

      D-Link Products:


      • DES-1210-08P (New)
      • DIR-300 (new)
      • DIR-300A (new)
      • DSR-250N (new)
      • DSR-500N (new)
      • DSR-1000 (new)
      • DSR-1000N (new)

      Huawei products:


      • HG8245 (new)

      Linksys products:


      • E1200
      • E2500
      • E3000 (new)
      • E3200 (new)
      • E4200 (new)
      • RV082 (new)
      • WRVS4400N

      Mikrotik products:


      • CCR1009 (new)
      • CCR1016
      • CCR1036
      • CCR1072
      • CRS109 (new)
      • CRS112 (new)
      • CRS125 (new)
      • RB411 (new)
      • RB450 (new)
      • RB750 (new)
      • RB911 (new)
      • RB921 (new)
      • RB941 (new)
      • RB951 (new)
      • RB952 (new)
      • RB960 (new)
      • RB962 (new)
      • RB1100 (new)
      • RB1200 (new)
      • RB2011 (new)
      • RB3011 (new)
      • RB Groove (new)
      • RB Omnitik (new)
      • STX5 (new)

      Netgear products:


      • DG834 (new)
      • DGN1000 (new)
      • DGN2200
      • DGN3500 (new)
      • FVS318N (new)
      • MBRN3000 (new)
      • R6400
      • R7000
      • R8000
      • WNR1000
      • WNR2000
      • WNR2200 (new)
      • WNR4000 (new)
      • WNDR3700 (new)
      • WNDR4000 (new)
      • WNDR4300 (new)
      • WNDR4300-TN (new)
      • UTM50 (new)

      QNAP products:


      • TS251
      • TS439 Pro
      • Other QNAP network storage systems running QTS software

      TP-Link products:


      • R600VPN
      • TL-WR741ND (new)
      • TL-WR841N (new)

      Ubiquiti products:


      • NSM2 (new)
      • PBE M5 (new)

      Upvel products:


      • Unknown models * (new)

      ZTE Products:


      • ZXHN H108N (new)

      * We have detected malware designed for Upvel products, but for the time being we cannot identify specific models of the devices to which it is targeted.
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