May 8, 2019 at 06:32Plane crash in Sheremetyevo: historical analogies
The abundance of cameras in the modern world has led to two consequences. Firstly, the plane crash taken from many angles in Sheremetyevo practically did not leave anyone indifferent. Secondly, in the public space there was a lot of instrumental evidence of what happened. But why this happened can only show the investigation, which will take time. And instead of wondering about the reasons that we should soon find out, it is better to recall similar cases from the history of aviation. Because broadening the horizons contributes to a less emotional and more balanced assessment of what happened.
Frame from one of the cameras
Photo by Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
On August 22, 1985, a Boeing 737-236 took off on the runway of Manchester Airport. At 36 seconds, the pilots heard a loud bang or clap and, assuming that the landing gear wheel had broken or the plane collided with a bird, they decided to interrupt the take-off. Nine seconds after the pop in the cab, the left engine fire alarm (No. 1) went off. 45 seconds elapsed from the clap to a complete stop, while the plane turned from the runway to the taxiway. There was a strong fire on the left side of the aircraft, with a weak crosswind carrying flame to its tail.
Scheme from the official report
The aircraft commander managed to announce the evacuation on the right side. Even before the plane stopped completely, the senior flight attendant began to open the right front door, but could not do it - the container of the inflatable ramp jammed it. The left front door was opened 25 seconds after the stop. The evacuation of passengers began, while the stewardess had to pull out people stuck in the aisle. The senior flight attendant again tried to open the jammed right door and was able to do this 70 seconds after the stop. Meanwhile, passengers in the 10th row tried to open the right emergency exit to the wing. The hatch fell on the passenger sitting by the window, but with the help of a passenger from the 11th row, stretching the hatch back, the evacuation through this exit began after about 45 seconds. Witnesses also saw an open right back door and an inflated emergency ramp, but no one was saved this way. 17 people left the plane through the left front door, 34 through the right front door and 27 through the right wing exit. Pilots left the plane through the emergency exits of the cockpit. The last survivor, a boy, was taken out of the right wing exit by the driver of a fire tender about 5.5 minutes after the plane stopped. 55 people could not be evacuated and died (one survivor was found unconscious near the front exits after 33 minutes, but died in the hospital). Thus, out of 131 passengers and 6 crew members, 53 passengers and both flight attendants were killed in the rear of the aircraft. the fire tender driver got from the right exit onto the wing about 5.5 minutes after the plane stopped. 55 people could not be evacuated and died (one survivor was found unconscious near the front exits after 33 minutes, but died in the hospital). Thus, out of 131 passengers and 6 crew members, 53 passengers and both flight attendants were killed in the rear of the aircraft. the fire tender driver got from the right exit onto the wing about 5.5 minutes after the plane stopped. 55 people could not be evacuated and died (one survivor was found unconscious near the front exits after 33 minutes, but died in the hospital). Thus, out of 131 passengers and 6 crew members, 53 passengers and both flight attendants were killed in the rear of the aircraft.
The color indicates who left the plane through which exit. The red crosses are dead, the number of evacuated through the right front exit does not coincide with the official report.
The cause of the fire was the destruction of the combustion chamber No. 9 of the left engine, but the greatest attention was paid to the process of evacuating passengers. The aircraft passed certification, in which a full evacuation through half the exits was carried out in 75 seconds instead of the required 90. But further studies showed that the actual conditions for the evacuation do not correspond to those on the certification - frightened people behave very differently, and in the front part of the plane there was a traffic jam. After the disaster, changes were made to the design of the salons to prevent this from happening again.
The salon quickly filled with toxic black smoke, and 48 out of 55 people died from poisoning from combustion products. The official report also raised the theme of smoke-proof hoods that could save many lives in this disaster.
A flight attendant in a hood trains to extinguish a fire
The idea of supplementing emergency equipment for passengers with smoke hoods was repeatedly raised in aviation, and the US Federal Aviation Administration even put forward such a requirement in 1969, but it was withdrawn in 1970. Until now, this issue remains debatable, for example, they argue that passengers will spend time putting on their hoods and evacuate more slowly, so only flight attendants now have them.
On June 2, 1983, a fire broke out in the tail toilet on an Air Canada DC-9-32 airplane flying the Dallas-Toronto-Montreal route. After 17 minutes, the plane made an emergency landing. Immediately after the stop, flight attendants and passengers opened the front exits and emergency exits to the wing. After 60-90 seconds after the start of the evacuation, the fire spread throughout the cabin. 18 passengers, 3 cabin crew and both pilots managed to evacuate, 23 passengers were killed. Due to the fact that the cabin was smoky and passengers from the rear part were transplanted forward, the exact places are unknown.
Scheme of survivors and deceased, illustration from the official report
Due to the fact that two bodies were found in the tail section, the requirements for a better illustration of the emergency exit directions were included in the set of recommendations for improving flight safety. So when you see luminous arrows on the plane to the nearest emergency exit, you should know that they appeared due to this disaster as well.
Due to the fact that the fire was later discovered and fought ineffectively, flight attendants received the best fire extinguishers, smoke hoods and began to undergo special fire training. Including after this catastrophe, the standard procedure was instructing passengers on how to open emergency exits to the wing.
Experts in the history of aviation accidents can recall another story, the so-called “Miracle in Toronto”, when on August 2, 2005 the Airbus A340 rolled out of the strip, collapsed and caught fire. Then, out of 309 people, passengers and crew, no one died. But, in my opinion, the diagram of the use of emergency exits indicates that the incident developed in a completely different way.
Evacuation diagram, illustration from the official report The
left tail exits L3 and L4 were blocked by fire and were not used, but two-thirds of the passengers left the plane through the right tail exit R4, which clearly indicates that the fire spread much more slowly than in two cases higher.
Since the disaster in Sheremetyevo, a video appeared that brings video from different cameras into one picture with a time reference.
Personally, I was waiting for the comment of the pilot and blogger Denis Okan, who did not write the post himself, but urged him to read this post with a discussion of the procedures .
On my own behalf, I want to add once again that before the publication of the results of the official investigation, it makes no sense to draw conclusions. The desire to do something is understandable, and the most reasonable thing I can advise is to watch the excellent popular science series “Investigation of Air Crash”, also known as “Mayday”, also known as “Air Crash Investigation”. The stories told there in a simple and understandable way explain how and why aviation accidents and disasters occur, and what is being done to make flights even safer.
Frame from one of the cameras
Flight 28M British Airtours
Photo by Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
On August 22, 1985, a Boeing 737-236 took off on the runway of Manchester Airport. At 36 seconds, the pilots heard a loud bang or clap and, assuming that the landing gear wheel had broken or the plane collided with a bird, they decided to interrupt the take-off. Nine seconds after the pop in the cab, the left engine fire alarm (No. 1) went off. 45 seconds elapsed from the clap to a complete stop, while the plane turned from the runway to the taxiway. There was a strong fire on the left side of the aircraft, with a weak crosswind carrying flame to its tail.
Scheme from the official report
The aircraft commander managed to announce the evacuation on the right side. Even before the plane stopped completely, the senior flight attendant began to open the right front door, but could not do it - the container of the inflatable ramp jammed it. The left front door was opened 25 seconds after the stop. The evacuation of passengers began, while the stewardess had to pull out people stuck in the aisle. The senior flight attendant again tried to open the jammed right door and was able to do this 70 seconds after the stop. Meanwhile, passengers in the 10th row tried to open the right emergency exit to the wing. The hatch fell on the passenger sitting by the window, but with the help of a passenger from the 11th row, stretching the hatch back, the evacuation through this exit began after about 45 seconds. Witnesses also saw an open right back door and an inflated emergency ramp, but no one was saved this way. 17 people left the plane through the left front door, 34 through the right front door and 27 through the right wing exit. Pilots left the plane through the emergency exits of the cockpit. The last survivor, a boy, was taken out of the right wing exit by the driver of a fire tender about 5.5 minutes after the plane stopped. 55 people could not be evacuated and died (one survivor was found unconscious near the front exits after 33 minutes, but died in the hospital). Thus, out of 131 passengers and 6 crew members, 53 passengers and both flight attendants were killed in the rear of the aircraft. the fire tender driver got from the right exit onto the wing about 5.5 minutes after the plane stopped. 55 people could not be evacuated and died (one survivor was found unconscious near the front exits after 33 minutes, but died in the hospital). Thus, out of 131 passengers and 6 crew members, 53 passengers and both flight attendants were killed in the rear of the aircraft. the fire tender driver got from the right exit onto the wing about 5.5 minutes after the plane stopped. 55 people could not be evacuated and died (one survivor was found unconscious near the front exits after 33 minutes, but died in the hospital). Thus, out of 131 passengers and 6 crew members, 53 passengers and both flight attendants were killed in the rear of the aircraft.
The color indicates who left the plane through which exit. The red crosses are dead, the number of evacuated through the right front exit does not coincide with the official report.
The cause of the fire was the destruction of the combustion chamber No. 9 of the left engine, but the greatest attention was paid to the process of evacuating passengers. The aircraft passed certification, in which a full evacuation through half the exits was carried out in 75 seconds instead of the required 90. But further studies showed that the actual conditions for the evacuation do not correspond to those on the certification - frightened people behave very differently, and in the front part of the plane there was a traffic jam. After the disaster, changes were made to the design of the salons to prevent this from happening again.
The salon quickly filled with toxic black smoke, and 48 out of 55 people died from poisoning from combustion products. The official report also raised the theme of smoke-proof hoods that could save many lives in this disaster.
A flight attendant in a hood trains to extinguish a fire
The idea of supplementing emergency equipment for passengers with smoke hoods was repeatedly raised in aviation, and the US Federal Aviation Administration even put forward such a requirement in 1969, but it was withdrawn in 1970. Until now, this issue remains debatable, for example, they argue that passengers will spend time putting on their hoods and evacuate more slowly, so only flight attendants now have them.
Air Canada Flight 797
On June 2, 1983, a fire broke out in the tail toilet on an Air Canada DC-9-32 airplane flying the Dallas-Toronto-Montreal route. After 17 minutes, the plane made an emergency landing. Immediately after the stop, flight attendants and passengers opened the front exits and emergency exits to the wing. After 60-90 seconds after the start of the evacuation, the fire spread throughout the cabin. 18 passengers, 3 cabin crew and both pilots managed to evacuate, 23 passengers were killed. Due to the fact that the cabin was smoky and passengers from the rear part were transplanted forward, the exact places are unknown.
Scheme of survivors and deceased, illustration from the official report
Due to the fact that two bodies were found in the tail section, the requirements for a better illustration of the emergency exit directions were included in the set of recommendations for improving flight safety. So when you see luminous arrows on the plane to the nearest emergency exit, you should know that they appeared due to this disaster as well.
Due to the fact that the fire was later discovered and fought ineffectively, flight attendants received the best fire extinguishers, smoke hoods and began to undergo special fire training. Including after this catastrophe, the standard procedure was instructing passengers on how to open emergency exits to the wing.
Air France Flight 358
Experts in the history of aviation accidents can recall another story, the so-called “Miracle in Toronto”, when on August 2, 2005 the Airbus A340 rolled out of the strip, collapsed and caught fire. Then, out of 309 people, passengers and crew, no one died. But, in my opinion, the diagram of the use of emergency exits indicates that the incident developed in a completely different way.
Evacuation diagram, illustration from the official report The
left tail exits L3 and L4 were blocked by fire and were not used, but two-thirds of the passengers left the plane through the right tail exit R4, which clearly indicates that the fire spread much more slowly than in two cases higher.
Conclusion
Since the disaster in Sheremetyevo, a video appeared that brings video from different cameras into one picture with a time reference.
Personally, I was waiting for the comment of the pilot and blogger Denis Okan, who did not write the post himself, but urged him to read this post with a discussion of the procedures .
On my own behalf, I want to add once again that before the publication of the results of the official investigation, it makes no sense to draw conclusions. The desire to do something is understandable, and the most reasonable thing I can advise is to watch the excellent popular science series “Investigation of Air Crash”, also known as “Mayday”, also known as “Air Crash Investigation”. The stories told there in a simple and understandable way explain how and why aviation accidents and disasters occur, and what is being done to make flights even safer.
- British Airtours Flight 28M - Season 1 Episode 1, Panic On The Runway
- Air Canada Flight 797 - Episode 3 Episode 4 Fire Fight
- Air France Flight 358 - Episode 4 of The Miracle Rescue / Miracle Escape Season 4
- "Goat" on the landing - 5 a series of the 14th season of "Death in Narita" / "Death At Narita"