Vulnerabilities of Kyivstar: 1) analysis of the previous post about passwords + 2) information about purchases passing through the services of Kyivstar

    Hey. I am the one who six years ago received the logins and passwords of Kyivstar from such important services as: JIRA, Amazon Web Services, Apple Developer, Google Developer, Bitbucket and many others, wrote them over Bug Bounty and received $ 50 various comments on my post repost .

    For example:

    Thank you for your support and comments! Voting results:

    For some reason I did not respond to some comments, but I cannot but answer now.

    I recall that I accidentally received a letter with bookmarks from the working browser of an employee of Kyivstar. I opened all 113 bookmarks one by one and found among them a file with the names of services, logins and passwords, and other information. Yes, the file was on Google Docs with “For All” access rights.

    I had concerns in their future reaction to the report, so
    Сперва на Bugcrowd я сообщил, чтобы они срочно поменяли пароли. Мне ответили, что знают про индексацию файлов из поста на Хабре и уже закрыли везде такие файлы.

    Я указал, что не закрыли, и прислал скриншоты, где видно, что я смог войти рандомно в их учётки.

    Затем меня спросили, как я получил такие данные, и я указал, как (получил на e-mail).

    Потом спросили, как я смог получить такой e-mail — и я ответил, что я везунчик, или просто сотрудница опечаталась, когда отправляла закладки себе (так и оказалось в итоге).

    В процессе переписки моему сигналу был присвоен наивысший приоритет — P1 (Sensitive Data Exposure: Critically Sensitive Data — Password Disclosure), в рамках которого выплаты составляют от $1000 до $3000 (а ещё можно сложить Mobile + WEB apps).

    Ну а дальше вы знаете.

    When my colleague Yegor Papyshev shared his opinion on Facebook, it was unpleasant to hear how another respected person (Vladimir Styran, information security specialist - CISSP, CISA, OSCP, CEH), was negatively disposed to the situation, and wrote to Egor that he was not knows the details and did not understand the situation.

    At the same time, Vladimir himself did not understand the situation. Here is his mocking post:

    It’s in you є bug і ti yogo vikidaєsh in the public, called Full Disclosure. Yakscho in you bug і ti yogo vіddaєsh ...

    Published by Volodymyr Styran  Wednesday, August 1, 2018

    I will translate and comment on the last few points:

    • If you are not aware that the support of the broker through which you informed the vendor a bug could help you to appeal against the amount of the payment, because in general this is one of his roles in your tripartite relations, this is called lohanut. - The support Bugcrowd in correspondence with me has repeatedly supported my opinion and the majority opinion that Kyivstar is wrong and should have paid more. "Broker" could not affect the operator. And it's not me who got lost.
    • If you begin to threaten the vendor of Full Disclosure in the event of no increase in payments, this is called extortion or blackmail. But most likely it will be called extortion, because there is no article for blackmail in the code. - There was no blackmail and extortion. There was no threat. Vladimir would have known about this if he had read that report. That is characteristic, my account on Bugcrowd was blocked (it is not scary) not immediately after the post on Habré, but about a week later, just at the same time as his other caustic post in FB.
    • If you do not have a bug, you read about it on Habré, you told about it on your Facebook page to get N likes and + M followers, then you are a blogger and there is nothing to be proud of. - There is nothing to add.

    However, as I know, Vladimir participated in the launch of the Bug Bounty company Kyivstar, so I admit that he has a blurred eye.

    Go ahead. A simple example: Apple Developer, you saw screenshots of their console in my post.
    In the file with passwords there were still lines and columns, and specifically Apple indicated the following: Last modified - 05/18/2016.

    Those. The last time the Apple developer account data was edited back in May of 2016, more than a year before I received the letter and found the link in it. Which, again, is confirmed by the fact that I was able to log in with the specified password.

    Thus, speaking of the security of business processes in Kyivstar, we can summarize:

    • moreover, that logins and passwords were stored (or stored?) on an external shared Google Docs resource with “For everyone” access rights,
    • not only does not require two-factor authentication for entry,
    • not only that many passwords were vocabulary and easily selectable and looked like (changed) upsups92, suchapassword, DigitTeam2017, Digital2016, Kyivstardigteam2017, ks-anya $ bd2016, KSDigit2018,
    • so these passwords have not changed for more than a year.

    What else. Many did not understand why such a strange amount of $ 5,800 was indicated, why not $ 6,000 exactly, why not a million dollars at once? “In his opinion, only the official cost of accounts exceeds $ 5,800.”

    The answer to this question was from the very beginning on Habré, they simply did not notice it:

    (to enlarge the image, open it in a new tab)

    The key here is “ open it in a new tab ” - when you click on the image ( direct link ), the full picture opens, where you can also see other columns: Last modified, Paid till (date), Need till (date), Project (as in ASUP), Type of payment, Cost, Currency.

    By simply summing the numbers from the “Cost” column, I obtained a figure of $ 5800 - this is the official (and not the cost of the accounts I have invented) in the listed services, which I indicated in the report on Bugcrowd.

    I didn’t ask and didn’t demand this amount, or any other amount, as Soultan did then , and compared their indicated reward of $ 50 with the minimumpossible damage - simply speaking, with the loss of access to the services for the purchase of which they spent> $ 5800.


    If anyone is interested, not so long ago, the Kyivstar BugBounty program was closed completely (not a private mode, but it was closed), and the Soultan employee who responded to comments here, recently left Kyivstar.

    By the way, in the comments under his farewell record of leaving the company he writes “Good luck, Vitaly!” An employee, who sent that ill-fated e-mail. So it goes.

    I added the information outlined above with a small update to the original post. I do not gloat over this. They made a mistake then - perhaps they are paying.

    pyrk2142 in the comments asked :
    This is quite unexpected. It turns out that the information here is no longer relevant?

    And now I can say that yes, the information on Bug Bounty Kyivstar is irrelevant: I found the opportunity to receive information about the purchases of people passing through the payment services of Kyivstar, even if they are not its customers. I gave the company a second chance - but she did not use it .

    So, the info about purchases passing through Kyivstar services, using even non-customer’s cards.

    During testing of an application by one company, I discovered that Kyivstar acts as a payment provider in the framework of cooperation with Visa QR Payments - mVisa - payments using a QR code go through .

    These are transactions of clients in such points of sale, as, for example:

    • Crema Caffe, Kyiv,
    • Smachno, Kyiv,
    • Third Floor Cafe, Kyiv - the first and most often operations were here. Apparently, this is a cafe on the 3rd floor in the Kyivstar office, where they started testing QR payments;
    • Auchan, Kyev,
    • Auchan, Lviv,
    • Auchan, Dnipropetrovska - Auchan hypermarket chain (Ukraine);
    • mVisa merchant;
    • GIVC, Kiev - State Information Center, Main Information and Computing Center, Kiev. Here there are accruals and calculations for the majority of utility payments of residents of Kiev;
    • GERC, Odesa - GERC, City Single Settlement Center, Odessa. Similar to the GIVC above, only the coverage is even greater: the site is intended not only for the population of Odessa, but also for such cities as: Kiev, Belgorod-Dniester, Reni, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny;
    • and so forth

    An example of the data obtained:

    {"Id":1305	Date:"2018-10-05T15:15:42.3921295"	State:0	Amount:-1278.8100	TipsAmount:0.0000	Currency:"UAH"	MerchantName:"Auchan"	MerchantCity:"Lviv"	MerchantId:"4109499405597549"	ApprovalCode:"516634"	ReferenceNumber:""	CardNumber:"5375XXXXXXXX3858"}
    {"Id":1308	Date:"2018-10-06T12:43:31.1179667"	State:3	Amount:-4192.9700	TipsAmount:0.0000	Currency:"UAH"	MerchantName:"Auchan"	MerchantCity:"Kyev"	MerchantId:"4109494835704666"	ApprovalCode:""	ReferenceNumber:"827991150697"	CardNumber:"4824XXXXXXXX6937"}
    {"Id":1702	Date:"2018-12-06T18:40:02.657213"	State:3	Amount:-81.0000	TipsAmount:0.0000	Currency:"UAH"	MerchantName:"GIVC"	MerchantCity:"Kiev"	MerchantId:"4109499632222754"	ApprovalCode:"605231"	ReferenceNumber:"834091189417"	CardNumber:"5168XXXXXXXX9997"}

    The service responded to requests only with the correct "Authorization" and "Map-AuthToken", the last of which contained Base64-encoded {"alg":"RS256","kid":"33E283272B0433E283281FF404CA6F031E28320","typ":"JWT"}{"":"0800300466", "":"1199333", "":"25046", "":"12342", "nbf":1541370000, "exp":1541380001, "iat":1541390001, "iss":"http://localhost", "aud":"http://localhost"}and other data.

    But despite the need for the request to have the correct parameters specified above, once having received the Map-AuthToken, then it was possible to perform GET requests to an address of the form many times.

    And although only for the period since launch, 16.04.2018, not so many operations were performed (~ 2000 units.), And the data itself are not critical, such a situation is alarming:
    even if you do not use Kyivstar and just pay in a shop A uchan card Bank Bed and ank, Hackers can crack the provider the K the C and receive information about you.

    In the field of payment cards, there is a situation that fits the description: a single point of compromise - it can be a terminal, an ATM, a trading company, an acquirer, a processing center, through which there have been thefts from different cards of different customers.

    Transferring the situation to the mobile operator: hacking one service, you can get information from several.

    Before publishing this material, I gave Kievstar a second chance - I sent three letters to, which is listed on their special page : December 17th, December 20th and December 27th, all working days.

    I sent, just in case, from a box that was not specified in a situation with leaked passwords. Letters have been received, but no feedback, not even an automatic reply, was received.

    As you understand, the vulnerability is not covered, so I can’t give more details. However, everything is clear.

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