Rumor has it that Navalny’s blog is blocked by fake DNS records

I hope everyone read yesterday’s news about an attempt to block the VKontakte site throughout Belarus, replacing it with a fake phishing mirror, so that the opposition would not reach the people.

Oddly enough, this morning there was a slight wave of rumors on blogs (here are some of its splashes: [ 1 ], [ 2 ], [ 3 ]), which say that this technology of our Western brothers was quickly transferred to Russian soil: bloggers noted the impossibility read the blog of the local opposition leader Navalny, known for the fight against corruption, and this impossibility is explained by their falsity in the DNS answers, that is, almost completely according to the Belarusian scenario, but there are two differences. At first,without phishing. Secondly, Beltelecom was suspected of a large (and sometimes non-alternative) provider Beltelecom in Russia - and in Russia, as far as I myself checked the ping command , the analogue of its Rostelecom (at least here in the south) does not deal with such the cones. We are talking about some other providers, far from being so large.

I don’t know what to think, gentlemen. It is clear that either the special services or the opposition (or maybe both of them) operate in the two countries according to the same scenario. But who drew up this scenario for them, deployed day by day with such efficiency? Or did a certain creative genius decide to shut up with an imitator, a copyist of someone else's drama?

In any case, this is not a mere coincidence. There are no such coincidences.