It is dangerous to consider virtual reality as an empathy machine.
Hi, Habr! I present to you the translation of the article on Aeon , the author - Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Santa Clara, Eric Romirez.
What is it like to be a cow? Researchers like Jeremy Beilinson, director of the Virtual Human Interaction Lab in California, believe they can help us figure it out. A few years ago, Beilinson and his colleagues at Stanford University created a slaughterhouse simulation. In a series of experiments, Beilinson invited people to wear a virtual reality headset (VR) and take a walk on all four limbs to experience what it would be like to be a cow fed for milk and meat. According to Beilinson:
“You go down to the trough, bow your head and pretend to drink some water. You go to a haystack, lower your head and pretend to eat hay. When you move from place to place, in truth you see how your cow is slightly spurred with an electric whip, and you feel a slight poke in the chest with a rod in your reality. ”
Some time after the experiment, people found that they began to eat less meat.In the subsequent book, Experience on Demand (Experience on Demand) (2018), Beilinson quotes a test subject who said: “I really felt like I was in a slaughterhouse ... and I felt sadness because I was a cow ".
Similar results have led Beilinson and others to proclaim BP a modern empathy machine. BP researchers tell us that simulations can allow us to see how day after day they experience humiliation from racist verbal attacks, from having to wander or even be an animal that is fed up for slaughter. It is hoped that this empathy with technological support will help us become better, kinder, more understanding people.
However, we should be skeptical of such statements. So far, BP can help us develop sympathy, but is not capable of creating real empathy. Although they are often confused, these abilities are not similar. The difference between them is this: empathy is associated with cognitive and emotional abilities that help us share the feelings of others. Empathy is what we use when we perceive the situation from another point of view. As for sympathy, it attracts abilities that help us empathize with others. This does not imply an idea of what it is like to be someone else.
Consider your reaction to the suffering of your close friend. You are not indifferent to your friends, you do not want them to suffer. Usually you try to help them and your actions are probably dictated by sympathy. In such cases, your main feelings are concern and anxiety, not suffering. However, when you show empathy to someone, something else happens. Empathy manifestation implies psychological complicity in someone's perception, climbing into someone else's skin or perception of the world through their eyes.
However, empathy is very, very difficult, and sometimes simply impossible. In his classic 1974 essay, the American philosopher Thomas Nagel claims that people cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat, even if they make significant efforts and live like it. "Provided that I could look and behave like a ... bat, without changing my nature," he wrote, "what I experienced would not at all resemble what these animals experience." This may seem obvious. There is a gap in understanding, because our essence, formed in the process of evolution, and our very human, very subjective and very personal life experience forms our understanding of the world. Even if we got out of the skin, trying to live like bats, Nagel doubted that we could show empathy for them: “To the extent
Something similar is happening at the Beilinson slaughterhouse. It does not matter how long the participants move on their four, no matter how often they are spurred by an electric whistle simulator, they do not show empathy for the cows. In other words, they experience what it is like to be a cow in a slaughterhouse. BP is a powerful tool, but it cannot fundamentally change the basic biological essence or psychology. Human experience is totally different from what a cow or bat is experiencing, so it’s impossible for us to know what their life is like. Although participants in the Beilinson experiment may think that they understand what it means to be cattle, and let them begin to feel some sympathy (eating less meat), they are just as far from empathic understanding of the suffering of an animal as they were before.
But can not BP help us at least understand the point of view of those people left without shelter or suffering from racial discrimination? After all, two people have more in common than humans and cows. However, here too, BP does not cope with creating a semblance of empathic experience of the experience of another person, whom it is suggested to believe. As with the Nagel bat, the best thing we can do with BP is to see how it can be for us to experience some form of temporary racial discrimination or vagrancy; and even in these cases, we should carefully distinguish between reality and the gaming experience of vagrancy and racism. Despite its full potential, BP is not able to show us what it is like to be someone else. In conjunction with the ideas of Nagel, she can only clearly demonstrate
Meaningful experiences, even the way you read these words right now, acquire their meaning, among other things, through the armor of the unconscious (the subconscious foundations of faith and belief). This includes not only biology, but also your cultural attitudes, past experiences, emotions, expectations, and even the specifics of the particular situations in which you find yourself. As the philosopher Alve Noah explains in his book Action in Perception (2004), perception is something that we actively do, and not something that we experience passively. Our expectations, along with the background processes, help to determine how we understand what we see, hear, feel or think, and these processes are different for each person. They are powerful enough to influence even seemingly subconscious processes of empathy (such as the excitation of mirror neurons). In one study, Northwestern University in Illinois in 2010 measured the effect of racial bias on the stressful experience of empathy (which is the feeling of the same pain that someone else feels). It showed that learned racial biases reduced the extent to which participants felt similar stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of the racial group they perceived. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices. In one study, Northwestern University in Illinois in 2010 measured the effect of racial bias on the stressful experience of empathy (which is the feeling of the same pain that someone else feels). It showed that learned racial biases reduced the extent to which participants felt similar stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of the racial group they perceived. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices. In one study, Northwestern University in Illinois in 2010 measured the effect of racial bias on the stressful experience of empathy (which is the feeling of the same pain that someone else feels). It showed that learned racial biases reduced the extent to which participants felt similar stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of the racial group they perceived. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices. that learned racial prejudices reduced the extent to which participants felt similarly stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of their perceived racial group. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices. that learned racial prejudices reduced the extent to which participants felt similarly stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of their perceived racial group. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices.
My life experience, for example, is based on the ideas that I acquired when I was an immigrant from Nicaragua to the USA in the 1980s. They do not coincide with the ideas of Michael Sterling, an African-American, whose eyes are supposed to be seen by participants in the BP experience “1000 Cut Journey” (“1000 travel cuts”), simulations of racial attacks. Although Michael and I are related by the human appearance (unlike me and the cow), and may we have a common biology, the best I can hope for after participating in the 1000 Cut Journey is a great sympathy for people like Michael. I cannot get rid of my subjectivity in order to see or experience everything from his point of view. It would be a mistake if I thought that the "1000 Cut Journey" would allow me to go into his skin.
Empathy and sympathy are not the same thing, and it is important to distinguish between them. Imagine if I conclude that being homeless is not so bad, because I enjoyed the fascinating puzzle pieces in the Becoming Homeless BP experience. Worse, imagine if I believed that I had a better idea of what it means to be homeless, and that my pleasure left me under the impression that everything was not as bad as I had feared. I could change my perception of the homeless and the types of political measures for which I voted. Such unsuccessful attempts at sympathy embedded in false beliefs about BP’s ability to produce empathy can be avoided. BP is an important tool, and research shows that it can radically affect how we think about the world. But one should not be too hasty and assume that it provides us with a truthful, empathic understanding from the first person. It really would be cow-like stupid.
What is it like to be a cow? Researchers like Jeremy Beilinson, director of the Virtual Human Interaction Lab in California, believe they can help us figure it out. A few years ago, Beilinson and his colleagues at Stanford University created a slaughterhouse simulation. In a series of experiments, Beilinson invited people to wear a virtual reality headset (VR) and take a walk on all four limbs to experience what it would be like to be a cow fed for milk and meat. According to Beilinson:
“You go down to the trough, bow your head and pretend to drink some water. You go to a haystack, lower your head and pretend to eat hay. When you move from place to place, in truth you see how your cow is slightly spurred with an electric whip, and you feel a slight poke in the chest with a rod in your reality. ”
Some time after the experiment, people found that they began to eat less meat.In the subsequent book, Experience on Demand (Experience on Demand) (2018), Beilinson quotes a test subject who said: “I really felt like I was in a slaughterhouse ... and I felt sadness because I was a cow ".
Similar results have led Beilinson and others to proclaim BP a modern empathy machine. BP researchers tell us that simulations can allow us to see how day after day they experience humiliation from racist verbal attacks, from having to wander or even be an animal that is fed up for slaughter. It is hoped that this empathy with technological support will help us become better, kinder, more understanding people.
However, we should be skeptical of such statements. So far, BP can help us develop sympathy, but is not capable of creating real empathy. Although they are often confused, these abilities are not similar. The difference between them is this: empathy is associated with cognitive and emotional abilities that help us share the feelings of others. Empathy is what we use when we perceive the situation from another point of view. As for sympathy, it attracts abilities that help us empathize with others. This does not imply an idea of what it is like to be someone else.
Consider your reaction to the suffering of your close friend. You are not indifferent to your friends, you do not want them to suffer. Usually you try to help them and your actions are probably dictated by sympathy. In such cases, your main feelings are concern and anxiety, not suffering. However, when you show empathy to someone, something else happens. Empathy manifestation implies psychological complicity in someone's perception, climbing into someone else's skin or perception of the world through their eyes.
However, empathy is very, very difficult, and sometimes simply impossible. In his classic 1974 essay, the American philosopher Thomas Nagel claims that people cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat, even if they make significant efforts and live like it. "Provided that I could look and behave like a ... bat, without changing my nature," he wrote, "what I experienced would not at all resemble what these animals experience." This may seem obvious. There is a gap in understanding, because our essence, formed in the process of evolution, and our very human, very subjective and very personal life experience forms our understanding of the world. Even if we got out of the skin, trying to live like bats, Nagel doubted that we could show empathy for them: “To the extent
Something similar is happening at the Beilinson slaughterhouse. It does not matter how long the participants move on their four, no matter how often they are spurred by an electric whistle simulator, they do not show empathy for the cows. In other words, they experience what it is like to be a cow in a slaughterhouse. BP is a powerful tool, but it cannot fundamentally change the basic biological essence or psychology. Human experience is totally different from what a cow or bat is experiencing, so it’s impossible for us to know what their life is like. Although participants in the Beilinson experiment may think that they understand what it means to be cattle, and let them begin to feel some sympathy (eating less meat), they are just as far from empathic understanding of the suffering of an animal as they were before.
But can not BP help us at least understand the point of view of those people left without shelter or suffering from racial discrimination? After all, two people have more in common than humans and cows. However, here too, BP does not cope with creating a semblance of empathic experience of the experience of another person, whom it is suggested to believe. As with the Nagel bat, the best thing we can do with BP is to see how it can be for us to experience some form of temporary racial discrimination or vagrancy; and even in these cases, we should carefully distinguish between reality and the gaming experience of vagrancy and racism. Despite its full potential, BP is not able to show us what it is like to be someone else. In conjunction with the ideas of Nagel, she can only clearly demonstrate
Meaningful experiences, even the way you read these words right now, acquire their meaning, among other things, through the armor of the unconscious (the subconscious foundations of faith and belief). This includes not only biology, but also your cultural attitudes, past experiences, emotions, expectations, and even the specifics of the particular situations in which you find yourself. As the philosopher Alve Noah explains in his book Action in Perception (2004), perception is something that we actively do, and not something that we experience passively. Our expectations, along with the background processes, help to determine how we understand what we see, hear, feel or think, and these processes are different for each person. They are powerful enough to influence even seemingly subconscious processes of empathy (such as the excitation of mirror neurons). In one study, Northwestern University in Illinois in 2010 measured the effect of racial bias on the stressful experience of empathy (which is the feeling of the same pain that someone else feels). It showed that learned racial biases reduced the extent to which participants felt similar stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of the racial group they perceived. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices. In one study, Northwestern University in Illinois in 2010 measured the effect of racial bias on the stressful experience of empathy (which is the feeling of the same pain that someone else feels). It showed that learned racial biases reduced the extent to which participants felt similar stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of the racial group they perceived. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices. In one study, Northwestern University in Illinois in 2010 measured the effect of racial bias on the stressful experience of empathy (which is the feeling of the same pain that someone else feels). It showed that learned racial biases reduced the extent to which participants felt similar stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of the racial group they perceived. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices. that learned racial prejudices reduced the extent to which participants felt similarly stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of their perceived racial group. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices. that learned racial prejudices reduced the extent to which participants felt similarly stressful experiences in relation to the suffering of other people outside of their perceived racial group. Although almost all of us are capable of experiencing stressful empathy, therefore, we share the essence in this part, even if the activity of the mirror neurons can be influenced by internal prejudices.
My life experience, for example, is based on the ideas that I acquired when I was an immigrant from Nicaragua to the USA in the 1980s. They do not coincide with the ideas of Michael Sterling, an African-American, whose eyes are supposed to be seen by participants in the BP experience “1000 Cut Journey” (“1000 travel cuts”), simulations of racial attacks. Although Michael and I are related by the human appearance (unlike me and the cow), and may we have a common biology, the best I can hope for after participating in the 1000 Cut Journey is a great sympathy for people like Michael. I cannot get rid of my subjectivity in order to see or experience everything from his point of view. It would be a mistake if I thought that the "1000 Cut Journey" would allow me to go into his skin.
Empathy and sympathy are not the same thing, and it is important to distinguish between them. Imagine if I conclude that being homeless is not so bad, because I enjoyed the fascinating puzzle pieces in the Becoming Homeless BP experience. Worse, imagine if I believed that I had a better idea of what it means to be homeless, and that my pleasure left me under the impression that everything was not as bad as I had feared. I could change my perception of the homeless and the types of political measures for which I voted. Such unsuccessful attempts at sympathy embedded in false beliefs about BP’s ability to produce empathy can be avoided. BP is an important tool, and research shows that it can radically affect how we think about the world. But one should not be too hasty and assume that it provides us with a truthful, empathic understanding from the first person. It really would be cow-like stupid.