September 11, 2015 at 00:59As an independent developer, he touched the legend. Part two
In those days, when the guys and I were just getting ready to launch, spring was in full swing. Everything revived, blossomed and smelled, and our enthusiasm for future accomplishments was young and bold. We lurked in anticipation of an independent jump into the market, about the income from which we knew only by stable salaries in strong gamedev companies. To younger readers it might seem that we can do it. For those who were more experienced, the opposite was obvious. Both sides as a result turned out to be right in their own way.
Lunch and a modern puzzle tracker, what else is needed for indie happiness?
6
FirstWhen the project was conducted in free time from work and family, it was easy. Stable income and predictability simplified a lot. One could allow oneself to take breaks for rest, to stop production for a long time, and at the same time not to feel that time was wasted. It was a hobby. Then, when the artist and I began to work full time, moved to a separate office apartment and began to dine with instant mashed potatoes, the sensations changed. Time became annoying and annoying, it began to put pressure and, along with money, turned into a resource that was only wasted. The situation has become very reminiscent of time running competitions, which I have always disliked, and it is not a matter of running at all, but of time racing. You must admit that running on Saturday mornings for yourself without any obligations usually brings much more pleasure.
Fortunately, we had the patience not to give up this run. Rainbow expectations, the lack of an objective assessment of the situation and the very fact of free flight throughout the entire distance alleviated anxiety.
And now the development of the game itself is completed. We got exhausted to this event and at the end of production we removed unnecessary tasks from the plan for one or two. And this despite the fact that almost the rest of the time they made the game at the maximum of their capabilities. For example, we could dig a week in some separate gameplay element, although as a result the player might not even see it. Alas, only at the end came the understanding that we did not have enough resources for such an approach. Surprisingly, at the same time we still had a plan and terms, which were respected more, and we tried to cut features. But, apparently, due to a lack of experience and a biased view of the situation, they did not cut enough. Although “Dungeons” is a well-formed and integral product, you don’t really care.
I would also like to note the painful experience learned from teamwork: there must be one person who makes final decisions in any plane. However, this is true for most creative groups. Because no matter how close you are in spirit, no matter how ideally your views coincide, and conflicts happen, and in order to get through them without loss, you need a clear subordination. Better before the start of the project is one awkward moment of figuring out who will be in charge, for example, by art, rather than a disaster due to the color of some interface element on the finish line.
7
Then began the process of creating our main distribution tool - a cinematic release trailer.
It was originally planned that we would use two channels for advertising: the existing VKontakte group of book-game lovers and a video clip. The group is small, a little more than 2 thousand people, but according to the calculations, they were very loyal players, ready to love and acquire the game in absentia, contributing to getting into some tops. The video, in turn, was positioned as a tool for word of mouth, because it was supposed to be plot and unusual.
Our team invested very tightly in the release trailer. Instead of the planned two or three weeks, it was spent about a month and a half, if you do not take into account the first unsuccessful call. Of course, we worked in free mode, we were often distracted, no one was in a hurry, and if desired, we could do everything faster. It was especially possible to accelerate hard if you hire professionals for various stages of work, but it did not work out.
In the very first call, we tried to work with a real director, but this attempt ended with a refusal to cooperate on our part. Firstly, the original script was rewritten and very little was left of the initial idea, which did not suit the team very much. Secondly, we wanted to make the trailer at a minimum cost, even if sacrificing quality somewhere, and the rewritten script incredibly complicated the technical and artistic parts, while greatly pushing up the budget. We parted, paused, changed and at the same time simplified the concept of the video, starting from the experience gained, and got involved in attempt number two.
This time everything went like clockwork, contacts already worked out from a previous attempt were especially useful: the director of photography and part-time installation specialist agreed to work with us without any problems. According to the already remade scenario, all organizational and preparatory work was decided within a week, then three days of intense filming for a full day, and then two leisurely weeks of work with the footage. We were very pleased with the result personally, it was concise, understandable and quite unusual. The video cost us $ 300-400 in net expenses, plus the team’s time (one man-month). They did everything on their own (one main person, one involved in filming and consultations) and by the forces of one involved specialist.
The result of this modest information company was not very good, at the end of the article I will share the numbers. This is especially bad, given the fact that a few days after the release, we advertised the game in the 300,000th profile game group Vkontakte.
In general, the advertising campaign was, as intended, a partisan one. That is, at minimal cost with an attempt to maximize the result. But alas. If you do not take into account the fact that the approach itself might turn out to be wrong, and also that the quality of execution might not be up to par, I personally drew a simple conclusion for myself: the value of social networks in my understanding is too exaggerated. For example, out of two thousand fans of book-games, only a little more than a hundred people migrated to the group dedicated to our "Dungeons" all the time. And these are the most loyal to game books people from the entire social network. And of the several thousand that learned about the release in the early days, only two or three dozen succumbed to the temptation. Given the discount and positive feedback.
For some games, a cinematic video is very obvious.
Yes, I understand very well that a paid product and an unpopular genre could fatally affect this. If you make a message to the past to yourself then, you would definitely ask to treat advertising as a tool, try its various forms, and not consider your game unique or unbelievable, but already starting from this simple fact, plan and act with a colder head.
8
Globally, the team and I personally think that they have achieved success, given that the main goal was still launching their game and gaining experience. Well, we were engaged in our favorite business, simultaneously plunging into memories from our youth. It has value, yes. But then the launch came, the culmination of one and a half years of work (of which six months were full-time) - and here we were already waiting for a terrible catastrophe. Commercial failure. I can’t say that we were ideological fighters, no, of course, somewhere always there was always the prospect of earning at least something on the project, although usually it was not spoken aloud. But what turned out as a result - it turned out to be much worse than even the most modest expectations.
So: from the start of sales to the present day - and this is a little more than two months - about 60 copies of the game were sold, some of which are at a discount. The total profit amounted to $ 78:
Dmitry Braslavsky was upset with us ...
After this result, all further plans were frozen: porting to Android, release of other book games on the established engine.
9
There are several reasons for this outcome. In general, the most useful thing that can be done at such a depth is to identify errors, and in the future try to repeat as few of them as possible. After all, one must be an incorrigible optimist in order to hope not to repeat them all.
A) The project itself - a book-game - is not the most popular mechanics. Although the bet was made precisely on the conquest of a very narrow niche (we are making a text game, and even exclusively on the Russian market), the scale of this niche can hardly be enough for a team of several independent developers to exist. And maybe enough, if you do not make all the other mistakes.
B)Directly implementation. Let me remind you that the project started exclusively as a hobby in a business free from work and family, so initially there was no bet on modern trends. Moreover, a colleague and artist was chosen in the same way: “Do you have free time? Let's do something. ” It turned out to be original in art and strange in mechanics and effects, but the market could have (and as it turned out - had) completely different needs. Yes, probably some fans of game books were satisfied with this implementation, but this was not enough.
IN)Lack of in-depth research. This is partly due to the fact that the project was supposed to take place for the sake of the project itself and the acquisition of related skills. Partly influenced by the fact that the project began as a hobby for evenings and weekends. As a result, a lot was done at random: tops were studied somehow, statistics were spotted in some places, some articles and studies were read, and then exactly the same conclusions were drawn - and suddenly. Spice it up with excitement and optimism and you will never get from such a team an answer to a simple question: “Guys, how and how much do you plan to specifically earn from this game?”
D)Lack of an experienced person (producer, indie colleague) to communicate. The simplest banal communication could be enough to mitigate the mistakes of A, B and C. There weren’t such people inside the team, and with my doubts I didn’t really break out. In vain. Of course, even having a publisher and a producer does not guarantee that the game will be adequately successful, there is also a lottery. But looking from the outside can refresh and encourage healing actions.
D)Too long and expensive production. Of course, I wanted to do right away in the best way, to direct ah. But in fact, it would be worthwhile to simplify something somewhere, not to finish it, because time is a valuable resource and it should be saved. Fans would forgive us our flaws, having received, for example, 15 illustrations instead of 20, and would have waited for bug fixes in updates, I am sure of that. But the time spent on polishing and filling content can not be returned. No one has yet canceled MVP and combat research.
I can’t call paid-monetization a failure factor. Most likely, even starting by free-to-play we would not get anything, the game is not so popular in principle. And the fans, those to whom we still reached out, not with a premium game, but, say, with an advertisement, we could only disappoint. Of course, this is also an assumption.
10
After the launch, much has changed. For example, the attitude to making money from games: earlier it was some kind of strange abstract goal number N, now it is a harmonious natural component of the whole process. Moreover, even if you work on a project in a large company, this thought will always make you think about the appropriateness of certain processes. This is useful for the company, and it is vital in those cases when you are trusted to lead any direction and make decisions.
I think this is the typical mood of any aspiring independent developer: to say that this is a business, but to treat what is happening as a lucky hobby. Because I have not yet received real problems, and excitedly read various success stories. And success stories, as well as shark attacks on humans, are few, but they give a very good reason for information. In turn, the stories of failures are spoken much less, but they are thousands of times more, as are deaths in the same car accidents.
In fact, it is more worth fearing just such sharks.
Summing up the line and answering the question posed in the first article, I’ll say: an independent developer should do an unusual project, which is based on unpopular mechanics, but only in two cases. First: the developer is ready to fail financially. Second: if you have a clear plan, marketing budget and good experience. In all other cases, this is hardly justified. We had option number one, but we very much believed that in the realities of the business, with weak resources and experience, it was not worth doing.
But I do not exclude any third scenarios. In the end, personal creative fulfillment is also important, the opportunity in old age to tell an interesting story to grandchildren about how grandfather took risks and fought, was a gambling and energetic villain, even if he sometimes lost. But this is worth a lot, as is the fact thata touch of the legend took place !
Lunch and a modern puzzle tracker, what else is needed for indie happiness?
6
FirstWhen the project was conducted in free time from work and family, it was easy. Stable income and predictability simplified a lot. One could allow oneself to take breaks for rest, to stop production for a long time, and at the same time not to feel that time was wasted. It was a hobby. Then, when the artist and I began to work full time, moved to a separate office apartment and began to dine with instant mashed potatoes, the sensations changed. Time became annoying and annoying, it began to put pressure and, along with money, turned into a resource that was only wasted. The situation has become very reminiscent of time running competitions, which I have always disliked, and it is not a matter of running at all, but of time racing. You must admit that running on Saturday mornings for yourself without any obligations usually brings much more pleasure.
Fortunately, we had the patience not to give up this run. Rainbow expectations, the lack of an objective assessment of the situation and the very fact of free flight throughout the entire distance alleviated anxiety.
And now the development of the game itself is completed. We got exhausted to this event and at the end of production we removed unnecessary tasks from the plan for one or two. And this despite the fact that almost the rest of the time they made the game at the maximum of their capabilities. For example, we could dig a week in some separate gameplay element, although as a result the player might not even see it. Alas, only at the end came the understanding that we did not have enough resources for such an approach. Surprisingly, at the same time we still had a plan and terms, which were respected more, and we tried to cut features. But, apparently, due to a lack of experience and a biased view of the situation, they did not cut enough. Although “Dungeons” is a well-formed and integral product, you don’t really care.
I would also like to note the painful experience learned from teamwork: there must be one person who makes final decisions in any plane. However, this is true for most creative groups. Because no matter how close you are in spirit, no matter how ideally your views coincide, and conflicts happen, and in order to get through them without loss, you need a clear subordination. Better before the start of the project is one awkward moment of figuring out who will be in charge, for example, by art, rather than a disaster due to the color of some interface element on the finish line.
7
Then began the process of creating our main distribution tool - a cinematic release trailer.
It was originally planned that we would use two channels for advertising: the existing VKontakte group of book-game lovers and a video clip. The group is small, a little more than 2 thousand people, but according to the calculations, they were very loyal players, ready to love and acquire the game in absentia, contributing to getting into some tops. The video, in turn, was positioned as a tool for word of mouth, because it was supposed to be plot and unusual.
Our team invested very tightly in the release trailer. Instead of the planned two or three weeks, it was spent about a month and a half, if you do not take into account the first unsuccessful call. Of course, we worked in free mode, we were often distracted, no one was in a hurry, and if desired, we could do everything faster. It was especially possible to accelerate hard if you hire professionals for various stages of work, but it did not work out.
In the very first call, we tried to work with a real director, but this attempt ended with a refusal to cooperate on our part. Firstly, the original script was rewritten and very little was left of the initial idea, which did not suit the team very much. Secondly, we wanted to make the trailer at a minimum cost, even if sacrificing quality somewhere, and the rewritten script incredibly complicated the technical and artistic parts, while greatly pushing up the budget. We parted, paused, changed and at the same time simplified the concept of the video, starting from the experience gained, and got involved in attempt number two.
This time everything went like clockwork, contacts already worked out from a previous attempt were especially useful: the director of photography and part-time installation specialist agreed to work with us without any problems. According to the already remade scenario, all organizational and preparatory work was decided within a week, then three days of intense filming for a full day, and then two leisurely weeks of work with the footage. We were very pleased with the result personally, it was concise, understandable and quite unusual. The video cost us $ 300-400 in net expenses, plus the team’s time (one man-month). They did everything on their own (one main person, one involved in filming and consultations) and by the forces of one involved specialist.
The result of this modest information company was not very good, at the end of the article I will share the numbers. This is especially bad, given the fact that a few days after the release, we advertised the game in the 300,000th profile game group Vkontakte.
In general, the advertising campaign was, as intended, a partisan one. That is, at minimal cost with an attempt to maximize the result. But alas. If you do not take into account the fact that the approach itself might turn out to be wrong, and also that the quality of execution might not be up to par, I personally drew a simple conclusion for myself: the value of social networks in my understanding is too exaggerated. For example, out of two thousand fans of book-games, only a little more than a hundred people migrated to the group dedicated to our "Dungeons" all the time. And these are the most loyal to game books people from the entire social network. And of the several thousand that learned about the release in the early days, only two or three dozen succumbed to the temptation. Given the discount and positive feedback.
For some games, a cinematic video is very obvious.
Yes, I understand very well that a paid product and an unpopular genre could fatally affect this. If you make a message to the past to yourself then, you would definitely ask to treat advertising as a tool, try its various forms, and not consider your game unique or unbelievable, but already starting from this simple fact, plan and act with a colder head.
8
Globally, the team and I personally think that they have achieved success, given that the main goal was still launching their game and gaining experience. Well, we were engaged in our favorite business, simultaneously plunging into memories from our youth. It has value, yes. But then the launch came, the culmination of one and a half years of work (of which six months were full-time) - and here we were already waiting for a terrible catastrophe. Commercial failure. I can’t say that we were ideological fighters, no, of course, somewhere always there was always the prospect of earning at least something on the project, although usually it was not spoken aloud. But what turned out as a result - it turned out to be much worse than even the most modest expectations.
So: from the start of sales to the present day - and this is a little more than two months - about 60 copies of the game were sold, some of which are at a discount. The total profit amounted to $ 78:
Dmitry Braslavsky was upset with us ...
After this result, all further plans were frozen: porting to Android, release of other book games on the established engine.
9
There are several reasons for this outcome. In general, the most useful thing that can be done at such a depth is to identify errors, and in the future try to repeat as few of them as possible. After all, one must be an incorrigible optimist in order to hope not to repeat them all.
A) The project itself - a book-game - is not the most popular mechanics. Although the bet was made precisely on the conquest of a very narrow niche (we are making a text game, and even exclusively on the Russian market), the scale of this niche can hardly be enough for a team of several independent developers to exist. And maybe enough, if you do not make all the other mistakes.
B)Directly implementation. Let me remind you that the project started exclusively as a hobby in a business free from work and family, so initially there was no bet on modern trends. Moreover, a colleague and artist was chosen in the same way: “Do you have free time? Let's do something. ” It turned out to be original in art and strange in mechanics and effects, but the market could have (and as it turned out - had) completely different needs. Yes, probably some fans of game books were satisfied with this implementation, but this was not enough.
IN)Lack of in-depth research. This is partly due to the fact that the project was supposed to take place for the sake of the project itself and the acquisition of related skills. Partly influenced by the fact that the project began as a hobby for evenings and weekends. As a result, a lot was done at random: tops were studied somehow, statistics were spotted in some places, some articles and studies were read, and then exactly the same conclusions were drawn - and suddenly. Spice it up with excitement and optimism and you will never get from such a team an answer to a simple question: “Guys, how and how much do you plan to specifically earn from this game?”
D)Lack of an experienced person (producer, indie colleague) to communicate. The simplest banal communication could be enough to mitigate the mistakes of A, B and C. There weren’t such people inside the team, and with my doubts I didn’t really break out. In vain. Of course, even having a publisher and a producer does not guarantee that the game will be adequately successful, there is also a lottery. But looking from the outside can refresh and encourage healing actions.
D)Too long and expensive production. Of course, I wanted to do right away in the best way, to direct ah. But in fact, it would be worthwhile to simplify something somewhere, not to finish it, because time is a valuable resource and it should be saved. Fans would forgive us our flaws, having received, for example, 15 illustrations instead of 20, and would have waited for bug fixes in updates, I am sure of that. But the time spent on polishing and filling content can not be returned. No one has yet canceled MVP and combat research.
I can’t call paid-monetization a failure factor. Most likely, even starting by free-to-play we would not get anything, the game is not so popular in principle. And the fans, those to whom we still reached out, not with a premium game, but, say, with an advertisement, we could only disappoint. Of course, this is also an assumption.
10
After the launch, much has changed. For example, the attitude to making money from games: earlier it was some kind of strange abstract goal number N, now it is a harmonious natural component of the whole process. Moreover, even if you work on a project in a large company, this thought will always make you think about the appropriateness of certain processes. This is useful for the company, and it is vital in those cases when you are trusted to lead any direction and make decisions.
I think this is the typical mood of any aspiring independent developer: to say that this is a business, but to treat what is happening as a lucky hobby. Because I have not yet received real problems, and excitedly read various success stories. And success stories, as well as shark attacks on humans, are few, but they give a very good reason for information. In turn, the stories of failures are spoken much less, but they are thousands of times more, as are deaths in the same car accidents.
In fact, it is more worth fearing just such sharks.
Summing up the line and answering the question posed in the first article, I’ll say: an independent developer should do an unusual project, which is based on unpopular mechanics, but only in two cases. First: the developer is ready to fail financially. Second: if you have a clear plan, marketing budget and good experience. In all other cases, this is hardly justified. We had option number one, but we very much believed that in the realities of the business, with weak resources and experience, it was not worth doing.
But I do not exclude any third scenarios. In the end, personal creative fulfillment is also important, the opportunity in old age to tell an interesting story to grandchildren about how grandfather took risks and fought, was a gambling and energetic villain, even if he sometimes lost. But this is worth a lot, as is the fact thata touch of the legend took place !